Tump's worst

The worst things about Trump seem to be:

1. Dishonesty

Truth has no meaning for Trump. What he says is simply a tool for some goal -- usually self-gratification. It's relationship to the truth is unimportant, though he sometimes tries to connect his statements to some kernel of something real to minimize blowback. The connection is usually distorted or exaggerated, or entirely fabricated.

It's often claimed that there's a liberal bias in universities, and most faculty overall and many others in universities probably lean that way. As regards Trump, this is not hard to explain. Universities and those involved with them seek the truth.  That's the business of education, research and science. People may be limited in attaining it by their own biases but, as a rule, they strive for it. They care about it, and it's the very basis of scientific progress. (The psychologist Marvin Frankel has suggested we've progressed in science but not so much in human affairs because the scientific method is open and truth-seeking, with ideas publicly criticized and tested before they are accepted.) This puts them at cross-purposes with conservative politics as represented by Trump and his followers. 

2. Motivated only by greed and desires for power, admiration/fame and revenge/cruelty (and presumably sex)

These seem to be all Trump cares about. Some or all no doubt play a part in the motivation of other politicians (and everyone else). But many or most politicians seem to also have other motivations (or at least inhibitions in expressing these). 

3. Incompetence

Even when Trump pursues a policy for his own reasons that may have some beneficial effect, those effects are generally not realized because of his ignorance and inattention to detail. 





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